An interesting report from the law firm Cooley crossed my desk this
week titled “Cooley Venture Financing Report” – ok, maybe not that
interesting – but the report looked at their 2Q12 venture deals (n=82),
so presumably a representative perspective on what is going on with
valuations and, nearly as important, terms.
The two headline trends surprised me: valuations tended to be up and
terms were balanced between company and investor. So now some of the
data:
Valuations:
Pre-money valuations for Series A, B, C and D+ rounds were $11, $40,
$54 and $140 million, respectively. I am surprised at how high the
Series A and B rounds were priced and at how low the Series C rounds
were valued (and who knows what are in the Series D+ data so I will
ignore those deals). Let me explain. Series A round sizes have been
coming down over the last few years as companies can get by with raising
less capital and given the crummy general economic conditions;
therefore I expected valuations for Series A to be a fraction of the $11
million witnessed. If companies are raising ~$5 million in typical
Series A rounds, this means that early investors are getting a 2+x
mark-up’s in the Series B rounds and management is not suffering as much
dilution (remember it is not how much you raise, but how much you own).
Now Series B rounds tend to be $10 to $15 million in size, which
implies that the C round valuations are basically flat to the B round.
Arguably the risk profile of many Series A companies is not meaningfully
different than that of a Series B company (lack of repeatable
sustainable commercial proof points, maybe incomplete team, product
development still work in progress, etc) – thus my surprise. Similar
risk at very different valuations.
Terms:
I expected the pendulum to swing very much in the favor of investors
for two reasons – capital is so scarce and with the bifurcation of the
venture capital industry (large vs small firms), I expected to see more
punitive terms come to the fore to drive syndicate alignment and good
investor behavior as smaller, weaker VC’s run out of capacity
(entrepreneurs – be very thoughtful about how you construct your
investor syndicate). I had also expected to see more “financial
engineering” introduced into term sheets so that VC’s could convince
themselves of generating a reasonable return even in a modest outcome. I
will highlight a couple of the more controversial terms and what Cooley
saw in the 2Q12 data.
Liquidation Preference – Across all 82 deals in
this cohort, 100% had <=1.0x liquidation preference which was very
surprising to me. In a typical quarter we see 10-15% of all deals with
preference greater than 1.0x, so while not a significant percent, it is
always present.
Participation – Appeared to be more prevalent
across all Series of rounds; in early rounds participation was present
nearly 75% of the time and in later rounds, it was there around 55% of
the time.
Recapitalizations – I had expected this phenomenon
to be quite evident but in fact it was only in 12% of the Cooley deals
(it had been between 6-8% for the previous five quarters. With the
explosion of new company creation over the past few years, I thought we
would see many tired syndicates looking for a fresh start.
Tranched Deals – For many of the same reasons as
with recaps, I expected to see this be a very big number but it was only
15% of the time, and actually down from the typical 20-25% from prior
quarters.
Pay-to-Play – This was probably the most surprising
one for me. Only 18% of deals (and only with Series C) was this term
present. This speaks directly to ensuring a strong supportive
syndicate; if some investors stop supporting the company, there would be
punitive ramifications. I had expected this to be closer to historic
norms of 25 to 30% of deals.